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Marks: Right to Counsel

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
MONROE COUNTY
People v. Dejac'
(decided February 2, 2001)
Defendant, Kurt Dejac, was charged with the felony of
driving while intoxicated. ("DWI" ).2 At a joint probable
cause/Huntley hearing3 and chemical test refusal hearing, Dejac
asserted that his state constitutional right to counsel4 was violated
because he was not advised of his right to have an attorney
present before making the decision not to submit to a breath test.5
Additionally, he argued that he was not given the required
Commissioner's warnings 6 prior to the time he refused to take the
chemical test. 7 On these grounds, Dejac filed a motion to
suppress evidence obtained by police, which included his refusal
to take a breath test, his statements made at the scene, and the
field test results. 8
Dejac hit a parked car and then sped off to a nearby
parking lot. 9 A witness notified the police of the incident and
after a preliminary inquiry, the police formally arrested Dejac for

'187 Misc. 2d 287, 721 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 2001).
2 Id.

at 287, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 492.

3 See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 848

(1965) (requiring that, before trial, a hearing must be conducted to determine
the voluntary nature of a confession prior to the admission of the confession to
the jury, and the judge must find voluntary nature beyond a reasonable doubt).
4 N.Y. CONST. art I, §6 states in pertinent part: "the accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel ... no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
5Dejac, 187 Misc.2d at 288, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
6Id.;

N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (2)(b)(1) (McKinney 2001) states in

pertinent part: that if after having " been requested to submit to ... a chemical
test and after having been informed that a person's license or permit to
drive ... shall be immediately suspended and subsequently revoked ... for
refusal to submit to such chemical test."
7
Id.
9Id.
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DWI. 10 Two minutes later, Dejac was read the required
Commissioner's warnings from a "refusal form" which stated, in
essence, that a person refusing to submit to a police requested
chemical test risks the immediate suspension and subsequent
revocation of his driver's license."
When one of the arresting officers asked Dejac if he
understood the warnings, he replied "absolutely."' 2 Dejac was
then asked to submit to a breath test.' 3 He responded that he
would like to speak to a lawyer. 4 When the arresting officers
told him that they did not have a telephone, Dejac told the police
that he had a cellular phone in his trunk.' 5 One of the arresting
officers retrieved Dejac's phone, and dialed the telephone number
that Dejac said was his lawyer's telephone number. 16 However,
one of Dejac's "in-laws" answered the phone instead of his
lawyer.17 About an hour later, Dejac was read the
Commissioner's warning
a second time, and again he refused to
8
take a breath test.'
At the combined probable cause/Huntley hearing and

chemical test refusal hearing, the court denied Dejac's motion to
suppress the evidence and his motion to suppress the refusal of
the breath test. 19 The New York Supreme Court, Monroe County
found that Dejac was given the required Commissioner's
warnings on the consequences of his refusal .20 The court
reasoned that the "privilege of access of counsel" rule 2' provides

10 Id.
1"Dejac, 187 Misc. 2d at 288, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 493; see supra note 6.
12 id.
131d.
14 id.
15Id.
16 Dejac,

187 Misc. 2d at 288, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
7 Id. at 289, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
18 Id.
Id. at 288, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
Id. at 289, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
21 See People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 227, 239 N.E.2d 351, 352, 292
'9
20

N.Y.S.2d 416,418 (1968) (holding that "law enforcement officials may not,
without justification, prevent access between the criminally accused and his
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defendants with the right to consult an attorney before deciding
whether to take a chemical test.22 However, the court also stated
that the "privilege of access to counsel" rule is a "'qualified'
statutory right and does not involve a constitutional right to
counsel, nor even a prophylactic measure to assure a reviewing
court that other constitutional rights will be observed by
police." 23 Therefore, defendants do not have a constitutional
right to refuse a breath test until their lawyer arrives at the
scene. 24 The court held that Dejac was afforded an adequate
opportunity to consult with counsel and stated that the arresting
officer had made an effort to comply with the request, but failed
because the defendant provided the police the wrong
information.25
26
In its analysis, the Dejac court relied on People v. Shaw,
a New York Court of Appeals case, where the defendant was
arrested for DWI and consented to take a breath test.27 In Shaw,
the defendant made a pre-trial motion to suppress the test
results. 28 He argued that his federal 29 and state 30 constitutional
right to counsel were violated because he was not advised of his
right to counsel when the police requested he take the breath
lawyer, available in person or by immediate telephone communication, if such
access does not interfere unduly with the matter at hand").

Dejac, 187 Misc. 2d at 289, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 494; Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d
224, 239 N.E. 2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416.
23 Dejac, 187 Misc. 2d at 291, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 494; see also People v.
Shaw, 72 N.Y.2d 1032, 1033, 531 N.E.2d 650, 651, 534 N.Y.S2d 929, 930
22

(1988).
24 Dejac, 187 Misc.2d at 289, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
25 Id.
26 72 N.Y.2d
27

at 1032, 531 N.E.2d at 650, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
Id. at 1033, 531 N.E.2d at 650, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 929.

28 id.
29

U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which states in pertinent part that "In all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense"; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (holding when an individual is taken into custody and subjected to

questioning he must be warned before any questioning that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires).
30

See supra note 4.
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test. 31 The defendant claimed that he should have been informed
of his right to counsel at the time the arresting officer asked him
to take the breath test, because it constituted a "critical stage" in
the proceeding.32 He urged that he needed an attorney to make
an informed choice of whether or not to take the breath test.33
The New York Court of Appeals held that although a
defendant in New York has the right to consult with an attorney
before deciding whether to take a chemical test, the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require
that the defendant be afforded counsel at that stage in the
proceeding. 34 The court reasoned that "in this State, a defendant
who has been arrested for driving while intoxicated, but not
formally charged in court, generally has the right to consult with
a lawyer before deciding whether to consent to a sobriety test, if
he requests the assistance of counsel." 35 Since the defendant did
not request an attorney's assistance,
he was not entitled to
36
suppress the results of his test.

In addition, the court in Dejac relied on People v.
O'Rama37 and People v. Kearney.38 These cases stand for the
proposition that it is the defendant's burden to prove that the
efforts by police did not afford him "adequate opportunity to
consult with counsel"

39 and

that the efforts by the police were not

"reasonable and sufficient under the circumstances." 40
Accordingly, the Dejac court applied these holdings to the facts
and found that Dejac did notproduce enough evidence to prove
that the arresting officer's efforts to contact defendant's counsel
were not reasonable and sufficient under the circumstances. 4'
3' Shaw, 72
32

N.Y.2d at 1033, 531 N.E.2d at 650, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 930.

id.

33 Id.

3 Id.
" Shaw, 72 N.Y.2d at 1033-34, 531 N.E.2d at 651, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 930;
see also Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d at 224, 239 N.E.2d at 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
36 Shaw, 72 N.Y.2d at 1033-34, 531 N.E.2d at 651, 534 N.Y.S.2d
at 930.
37 78 N.Y.2d 270, 579 N.E.2d 189, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1991).
" 261 A.D.2d 638, 691 N.Y.S.2d 71 (2d Dep't 1999).
'9 O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d at 280, 579 N.E.2d at 194, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
40 id.

4' Dejac,

187 Misc. 2d at 292, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
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The court reasoned that Dejac did not prove that the police had
any more information in their possession other than the telephone
number that the arresting officer had already dialed, "from which
the [arresting officers] might have continued a further 'reasonable
and sufficient' effort to contact an attorney." 42 Therefore, the
court held that the defendant 43was afforded an adequate
opportunity to consult with counsel.
The scope of the United States Constitution's right to
counsel was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Kirby v. Illinois. 4 The Court in Kirby addressed the issue of
when a defendant accused of a crime should be afforded his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 45 In Kirby, two police officers
stopped the defendant and his companion and asked to see their
identification.46 The defendant produced a wallet containing the
contents of another man's wallet that had been reported stolen the
day before. 4 The police officers arrested the defendant and his
companion and brought them to the police station.48
The
defendant did not have a lawyer present in the room, nor was he
advised to any right to counsel. 49 The police brought the wallet
robbery victim to the station and he positively identified the two
defendants as the men who robbed him two days earlier.5 ° More
than six weeks later, the men were indicted for robbery. 51 Upon
arraignment, counsel was appointed to represent them.52 At trial,
the jury found them guilty. 53 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected their argument that an absolute constitutional
guarantee be imported into a routine police investigation. 54
42 id.

43 Id.

"406 U.S. 682 (1972).
41
46

Id. at 689. See supra note 29.
Id. at 684.

47 id.

41
49

Id. at 685.
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 685.

50 Id.
51 Id.
52 id.

53 id.
14 Kirby, 406 U.S. at
686.
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Illinois
court's decision and held that the defendants did not have a right
to counsel for pre-indictment confrontations." The Court relied
on the firmly established principle that a person's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him and
that a defendant's pre-indictment confrontation does not amount
to a judicial proceeding. 56 The Court defined the commencement
of the adversary judicial criminal proceeding as those "points of
time at or after a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment. ,57 The Court reasoned that this is
the point at which "the government has committed itself to
prosecute ... and
this
point,
therefore,
marks
the
commencement of the 'criminal proceeding' to which alone
the
58
"
applicable.
are
Amendment
explicit guarantees of the Sixth
In New York, a person who asks for a lawyer when faced
with the decision of whether or to submit to a breath test also
does not have a constitutional right to have an attorney present.
At this point, the defendant is not at a "critical stage" in the
proceeding "within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. ,59 In
this respect, the federal and state constitutional standards are the
same.
However, a defendant in New York has a statutory right
to "telephone his lawyer or consult with a lawyer present in the
station house or immediately available there, [if] no danger of
delay is posed which might nullify the statutory procedure
requiring drivers to choose between taking the [breath] test and a
license suspension. ,60 If the defendant requests an attorney, it is
his burden to prove at the hearing or trial that the arresting
51
56

Id. at 688.

Id. at 690.

7 Id. at 689.
Id; see also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (holding that

58

the petitioners were entitled to counsel at the preliminary hearing because it

was a critical phase of the proceeding).
'9 Shaw, 72 N.Y.2d at 1033, 531 N.E.2d at 650, 534 N.Y.2d at 930.
60 Dejac, 187 Misc. 2d at 290, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 494 (quoting Gursey, 22
N.Y.2d at 229, 239 N.E.2d at 362, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 418).
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officer did not make a "reasonable and sufficient" effort to afford
61
him with "adequate opportunity to consult with counsel."
Dejac did not meet his burden because he failed to prove that he
provided the arresting officers with information other than his
"in-law's" telephone number which he represented was his
lawyer's phone number.62 Nor did Dejac prove that he desired
more than the initial call made by the arresting officer.63
Therefore, Dejac was afforded adequate opportunity to consult
with counsel in compliance with his statutory right. In addition,
since Dejac had no constitutional right to consult with an attorney
at the time of his decision to take a breath test, Dejac's motion to
suppress the evidence obtained by police, his refusal to take the
breath test and the field test results were properly denied.
Danielle Marks

61

Shaw, 72 N.Y.2d at 1033-34, 531 N.E.2d at 651, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 930.

62

Dejac, 187 Misc. 2d at 292, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 496.

63

id.
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